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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant1 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION and THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 8659 
This appeal is taken from the order of the District Court 
for Salt Lake County, sustaining the Motion to Dismiss filed 
by the State Tax Commission, on the ground that the com-
plaint does not contain sufficient facts to constitute a basis for 
relief as prayed. There was no formal appearance by the 
State of Utah, but the matter is presented to this court as though 
the State of Utah had also filed the Motion to dismiss, and 
the State of Utah is designated as Respondent herein. No 
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question of parties has been raised and it will not be considered 
material unless raised by this court. 
The complaint alleges, in effect, that a Trustee held title 
to certain motor vehicle equipment in the State of Utah for 
the purpose of leasing it to two corporations, Orange Trans-
portation Company, an Idaho corporation, and Collett Tank 
Lines, a Utah corporation. These two corporations went out 
of business by selling all of their capital stock to the plaintiff 
and as part of the transaction the Trustee sold the motor vehicle 
equipment to the plaintiff. This equipment consisted of trucks 
and tractors, and included also semi-trailers. The State Tax 
Commission refused to register any of this equipment until 
the sales tax was paid by the plaintiff, which was the purchaser. 
The plaintiff, therefore, paid under protest on the 15th day 
of January, 1957, assessed tax in the amount of $8,174.83 which 
was the combined tax on the sale price of the motor vehicle 
tractors, the motor vehicle trucks and the semi-trailers which 
are used in connection with tractors. The item of $8,174.83 
is not broken down as to the various classes of equipment sold. 
The complaint alleges that the sellers of the equipment 
were not engaged in the business of selling property to users 
or consumers and that it was not an isolated or occasional sale 
by a retailer as defined in Section 59-15-2 (E) U.C.A. 1953, 
and alleges that none of the sellers was engaged in a regularly 
organized retail business within the meaning of that section. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Utah Sales Tax Act is not applicable to sales by 
persons other than retailers, as defined in the Statute. 
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2. Semi-trailers, as used by a motor carrier of property are 
not taxable under the Sales Tax Act when sold in occasional or 
isolated transactions. 
3. Amendment of the definition and collection sections 
of the Sales Tax Act does not alter the scope of the tax. 
4. An interpretation of the Statute singling out motor 
vehicles for taxation when sold in isolated or occasional trans-
actions would be unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Utah Sales Tax Act is not applicable to sales by 
persons other than retailers, as defined in the Statute. 
Section 59-14-4 U.C.A. is the section of the Utah Code 
which levies what is referred to as the Sales Tax. This section 
reads: 
"there is levied ... (a) A tax upon every retail sale 
of tangible personal property made within the State 
of Utah ... " 
The definition section of Chapter 15 ( 59-15-2) defines 
"retail sale" as "every sale within the State of Utah by a 
retailer . . . to a user or consumer." A "retailer" is defined as 
"a person doing regularly organized retail business in tangible 
personal property, known to the public as such and selling to 
the user or consumer and not for resale." Under no stretch 
of the imagination does the term "retailer" include one engag-
ing in a transaction of the nature here involved, that is, the 
sale of rolling stock by one carrier to another as part of the 
sale of the business. The definitional section referred to says, 
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"that no sale of a motor vehicle shall be deemed isolated 
or occasional for the purposes of this act." The effect of this 
language is to treat the sales of motor vehicles as "usual" 
or "regular" instead of "isolated" or "occasional." Then, 
assuming that the sales of motor vehicles are usual, or regular, 
does that make the seller in this case a ''retailer''? (''Retail 
sale' means every sale ... by a retailer.") By no means does 
this follow. The seller in this case was not "doing a regularly 
organized retail business" of selling trucks, or of selling any 
other commodity. The seller was not "known to the public 
as such." It follows that no "retail sale" was involved in the 
purchase of trucks by the appellant in this case, and Section 
59-15-4 U.C.A. levies a tax "upon every retail sale." There-
fore, the act of the respondent was unauthorized in compelling 
payment of a tax by the appellant. Even if the legislative 
intent could be clearly shown, and it cannot, it shouldn't be 
used to go against plain terms of the statute to reach trans-
actions upon which no tax is levied. 
To be sure, there is some question or doubt as to the 
purpose of the words in the definitional Section of 59-15-2 
referring to isolated or occasional sales of motor vehicles, but 
the clear import of the language in the section levying a tax 
(59-15-4) and the correlative definitional Section (59-15-2) 
is not to include taxes such as that to the appellant. The United 
States Supreme Court in the Gould case stated a rule which 
has become almost axiomatic: 
··In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is 
the established rule not to extend their provisions by 
implication, beyond the clear import of the language 
used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt 
they are construed most strongly against the govern-
ment and in favor of the citizen." 
(Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 62 L. Ed. 211, 38 
S. Ct. 53; see generally, 3 Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction 293 and cases there cited.) 
Even if it be said that the clear intention of the legislature 
is to raise revenue by taxing the sale of motor vehicles, effect 
of the language used, as we have seen, is to tax only retail 
sales and the courts should not adopt a strained construction 
m order to put into effect what may be said, by the collectors 
of the tax, to be the intention of the legislature. Crawford 
in his text, Statutory Construction, points up this rule of Con-
struction as it applies to sales taxes in these words: 
"Naturally, those laws which impose a tax on sales, 
being tax laws, are subject to a strict construction in 
accord with tax statutes generally. In other words, a 
sales tax statute must be strictly construed in consider-
ing its coverage, and no strained construction may be 
indulged in against the taxpayer simply because of the 
apparent purpose to raise needed revenue ... " (p. 
738). 
In Tennessee a case arose which is analgous in many 
ways to the case at bar. Both cases involve statutory construc-
tion of a statute which though containing certain terms which 
might include the taxpayer, has controlling language which 
clearly does not include the taxpayer. In the Tennessee case 
(State v. McLemore, 290 S.W. 386), the State sought to hold 
that certain compulsory insurance was applicable to the auto-
mobile of the taxpayer who operated the automobile for hire, 
using a fixed stand, charging fares proportional to the haul 
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and the number of passengers in each case, but not operating 
between fixed termini or over a regular route. The court said: 
"The caption is broad, covering all 'motor vehicles 
... for hire, 'and the word 'taxicab' is given a defini-
tion practically as broad, and it may be plausibly con-
tended that the protection sought to be provided 
might fairly be so extended, but the language of sec-
tion 2 is definitely limited. 'It shall be unlawful for 
any person . . . to operate any motor vehicle . . . for 
hire, between fixed termini, without executing bond 
or providing insurance,' etc. This is the controlling 
language of the act. The broad terms of the caption 
and the references to taxicabs, contained in the body 
of the act, fairly suggest a possible original purpose 
to enact legislation which would apply to all motor 
vehicles driven for hire, whether strictly taxicabs or 
not (except when coming under a municipal ordinance 
having similar requirements) ; but the manifest ambi-
guity and confusion in the frame and language of the 
act as it now appears indicates restrictive changes in-
artificially made before final passage. 
11However this may be, we find the language of the 
act heretofore quoted declaring rwhat shall be unlawful' 
reasonably clear (emphasis added.) While in arriving 
at the intent, which is always important, the apparent 
general purpose of legislation may be considered, 'it 
is also a settled rule of interpretation in this state,' as 
said by Mr. Justice Lansden in Plow Co. v. Hays, 125 
Tenn. 155, 140 S.W. 1069, 'that statutes levying taxes 
or duties upon citizens will not be extended by impli-
cation beyond the clear import of the language used, 
nor will their operation be enlarged so as to embrace 
matters not specifically pointed out, although standing 
upon close analogy ... Burdens are not to be imposed 
beyond what the statute expressly imports.' " 
In the case just cited, words were used by the legislature 
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which indicated a certain intent, but which the court found 
negatived by express and controlling language. In the case at 
bar, too, there is an indication of a possible legislative intent 
regarding motor vehicles, which we have seen, however, is 
negatived by the express and controlling language taxing 
retail sales by retailers, which language does not include the 
appellants. 
An analysis of the definition section from a grammatical 
point of view may be helpful. Section 59-15-4 imposes an excise 
tax "upon every retail sale of tangible personal property." 
Then Section 59-15-2 (e) defines the term "retailer" as a person 
conducting "a regularly organized retail business in tangible 
personal property." Then the latter half of that subsection 
defines the term "retail sale." This definition is analyzed as 
follows: 
RETAIL SALE: 
I. Sale by retailer or wholesaler to user or consumer. 
(a) Wholesale sales excluded 
(b) Exempted sales excluded 
(c) Isolated or occasional sales (by persons not regu-
larly engaged in business) excluded 
(d) Seasonal sales and agricultural sales excluded 
( 1) Provided no sale of motor vericle is isolated 
or occasional. 
The last clause of subsection 59-15-2 ( 2) states: "but the 
term 'retail sale' is not intended to include isolated nor occa-
sional sales by persons not regularly engaged in business . 
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provided, however, that no sale of a motor vehicle shall be 
deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of this act." 
This clause is separated from the clause defining retail sale 
by a semicolon. 
It is submitted that this clause excluding "isolated or oc-
casional sales by persons not regularly engaged in businessn 
from the definition of "retail sale" is merely a reiteration (in 
the negative) of the first clause of this subsection which states, 
"the term 'retailer' means a person doing a regularly organized 
retail business ... " The sellers here were not in the business 
of selling to the user or consumer and their isolated or occa-
5ional sales were therefore excluded both generally and speci-
fically. 
The proviso part of the last clause of subsection 59-15-
2 (e) , ''sale of a motor vehicle shall not be deemed isolated 
or occasional," was obviously meant to limit only the sales 
excluded from the term "retail sale." This is obvious from a 
grammatical standpoint in that this part is separated from the 
last clause by a comma, while the exclusionary clause is sepa-
rated from the definition of a retail sale by a semicolon. This 
mterpretation is obvious from a sense, or meaning standpoint, 
in that the clause speaks of isolated or occasional sales, and 
the proviso shows what shall not be deemed isolated or occa-
sional. 
Thus, while upon first reading it might appear that any 
sale of a motor vehicle is a retail sale subject to a sales tax, it 
can be seen upon analyzing the subsection, both from a gram-
matical and a meaning standpoint, that there must be a sale 
10 
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by a person doing a regularly organized business of selling 
to the user or consumer in order to constitute a "retail sale." 
It is clear that the sale of a motor vehicle cannot be 
deemed isolated or occasional. But the fact that a sale is not 
isolated or occasional does not make it subject to the sales tax 
imposed by Section 59-15-4. There still must be a sale by a 
retailer to a user or consumer. 
The meaning of the phrase "isolated or occasional sales" 
when applied to persons who are regularly engaged in business 
must be that sales by such persons are covered even though 
they involve commodities not regularly dealt in. For example, 
jf a regular retailer of dry goods gets a special deal on electrical 
appliances and sells that one shipment out, it would be in the 
nature of isolated or occasional sales, but would still be 
covered. Or, if a sporting goods house orders a large inboard 
motor boat on special purchase, that would be an isolated or 
occasional sale, but would still be covered, because it is within 
the volume of business done by a regularly organized retailer. 
If such a retailer sold his fixtures and bought new fixtures for 
his store, it would appear to be an occasional sale, but would 
still be covered. And, likewise, if a grocery store which makes 
deliveries sells its delivery truck, that would appear to be an 
isolated or occasional sale and would be subject to the act. 
And the definition states, specifically, that no sale of a motor 
vehicle shall be considered an isolated or occasional sale, 
without looking any further into the comparison of that trans-
action with other regular transactions of the person making 
the sale. But there still is no modification of the application 
of the act to retailers only, and to retail sales only, and the sale 
here involved was not by a retailer and was not a retail sale. 
11 
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For courts consciously or unconsciously to ignore the word-
ing of a statute in order to put into effect what they conceive 
to be the legislative intent, at times might prove a service to 
the legislature and the community from a nearsighted point 
of view. But in the long run a grave disservice would be 
perpetrated on the judicial and the legislative systems, and 
thus to the community. Legislative enactments could easily be-
come a mockery were courts to infer anything they might 
conceive of as the intention of the legislature, irrespective 
of the wording of the enactment. 
·'Where there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning 
of a revenue statute it should be resolved in favor of 
those taxed." 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 293. 
Cases: Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 62 L. Ed. 211, 
38 S. Ct. 53 ( 1915); Stephens v. Glander, 151 Ohio 
St. 62, 84 N. E. 2d 279 (1949); Campana Corp. v. 
Cmr. 210 F 2d 897 (1954); Allen v. Atlanta lvietallic 
Casket Co., 197 F 2d 460 ( 1952); Masonite Corp. v. 
Fly, 194 F 2d 257 (1952); Peck v. State, 216 P 2d 
132 (1950); Walgreen Co. v. Gross Inc. Tax Div., 
75 N. E. 2d 784 ( 1947); Langford v. Aten, 39 N. W. 
2d 82 (1949); Salomon v. Jersey City, 97 A 2d 405 
( 19 53) ; School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Frankford 
Grocery Co., 103 A 2d 738 ( 1954); Bott v. Common-
wealth, 48 S. E. 2d 235 (1948). 
Revzan v. Nudelman, 18 N. E. 2d. 219 (Illinois): This 
case involved a sales tax law and was decided in favor of the 
taxpayer by subjecting the words "use" and "consumption" to 
their restrictive meaning of "use up" or "exhaust." The court 
said: 
··In the first place, it must be remembered that the 
act imposes a tax only upon persons engaged in the 
business of selling at retail. No other class is included 
12 
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in its provisions, either expressly or by necessary im-
plications. Defendants insist that the sole leather and 
rubber heels sold by plaintiffs to repairmen are retail 
sales, on the theory that such materials are used or 
consumed by the repairman. This brings us to a con-
sideration of the meaning of the terms: 'for use or 
consumption.' In construing a statute, 'it is funda-
mental that taxing laws must be strictly construed. They 
are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear 
import of the language used. In case of doubt, they 
are construed most strongly against the government and 
in favor of the taxpayer. Strict construction does not 
require that the words be given the narrowest meaning 
of which they are susceptible, and words of the act 
are to be given their full meaning." 
Bedford v. Johnson, 78 P. 2d, 373 (Colo.): 
"This court has repeatedly held that statutes levying 
taxes or duties upon citizens will not be extended by 
implication beyond the clear import of the language 
used, nor will their operation be enlarged so as to 
embrace matters not specifically pointed out, although 
standing upon a close analogy, and all questions of 
doubt will be resolved against the government and in 
favor of the citizen, and because burdens are not to 
be imposed beyond what the statute expressly imports." 
This case was one where the court refused to regard auto-
mobile parking lots as falling within the scope of a statute 
which imposed a tax on general warehouse storage establish-
ments. 
Doran v. Crenshaw (Tenn.) 61 S. W. 2d, 469: Held that 
the tax under the heading of "Florists," imposing a tax upon 
each person dealing in cut flowers or potted plants, conducting 
the business of a florist from a regular place of business, and 
1~ 
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each person selling cut flowers, shrubs, or potted plants on the 
streets or at other places outside a regular store, did not include 
a horticulturist engaged in the operation of a nursery and 
greenhouse on his land at 1732 Felix Avenue where he grows 
from the soil various kinds of flowering and perennial plants 
and shrubs, which he sells to dealers and the public generally: 
·'This language so limited cannot be extended by implication 
to embrace a producer of plants and flowers. To do so would 
be to reach beyond the clear import of the language used ... " 
It is to be concluded from the foregoing that the respond-
ent unlawfully imposed a tax on the appellants with respect 
to the purchaser of the motor vehicles and trailers here in-
volved. The sellers were not retailers and this was not a retail 
sale. 
2. Semi-trailers, as used by a motor carrier, are not tax-
able under the Sales Tax Act when sold in occasional or iso-
lated transactions. 
Should the court find isolated or occasional sales of motor 
vehicles taxable under the Sales Tax Act, such a finding should 
not include semi-trailers. 
Motor vehicles as referred to under the Sales Tax Act in 
Sections 59-15-2 and 59-15-5, U.C.A., are nowhere defined 
under the Act. He who would interpret the meaning of "motor 
vehicle" is left to interpret by analogy or common understand-
ing. Interpretation by analogy has strong support from the 
wording of the statute. Section 59-15-5 refers to "every sale 
of a motor vehicle subject to registration and licensing under 
the laws of this state." Reference to registration and licensing 
1-t 
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would logically refer one to the Motor Vehicle Act for a defi-
nition of the term "motor vehicle." Section 41-1-1, U.C.A. 
defines "motor vehicle" as: 
"Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained 
from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon 
rails." 
A semi-trailer is certainly not included within this definition 
of "motor vehicle." A semi-trailer is not self-propelled. More-
over, "semi-trailer" is defined in the same section as: 
"Every vehicle without active power designed for 
carrying persons or property and for being drawn by 
a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of 
its weight and that of its load rests or is carried by 
another vehicle." 
It is evident that the terms "motor vehicle" and semi-trailer" 
are mutually exclusive, as defined in Section 41-1-1. The term 
which the legislature, had it so desired, could have used to 
include both a motor vehicle and a semi-trailer would have 
been "vehicle," which is defined as: 
"Every device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a 
highway, excepting devices moved by human power 
or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." 
However, the legislature did not choose to use the term "ve-
hicle." It would seem clear from this analysis that the legisla-
ture did not intend to include semi-trailers in "motor vehicles." 
If the above analysis is not sufficient, recourse must be 
had to the common understanding of the meaning of motor 
vehicle, for the words employed in a tax statute "are to be 
15 
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given their ordinary meaning." (51 Am. Jur. 362 and cases 
cited.) 
Unquestionably, the ordinary meaning of motor vehicle 
would be a vehicle with a motor. A semi-trailer certainly does 
not come under such a category. It neither has a motor to 
propel it nor is it part of a vehicle with a motor. 
Webster's New International Dictionary does not have 
a definition of "motor vehicle." Words and Phrases, Vol. 27, 
at page 707, and the 1957 Cumulative Supplement at page 
181 contain about a dozen cases passing on the question 
whether a trailer or a semi-trailer is a motor vehicle. All of 
them hold that a trailer is not a motor vehicle because it is 
not propelled by a motor, and only one case is contra. This 
is Department of Motor Transport vs. Motor Convoys (Ky.), 
279 S. W. 2d, 815 and 816. In that case the Court was apply-
ing a tax statute on new "motor vehicles" but had another 
statute which defined "motor vehicle" as "any motor propellec,l 
vehicle . . . including any such vehicle operated as a unit i~ 
combination with other vehicles . . . " 
Under either the Utah statutes or the ordinary meanings 
of the words "motor vehicles" the sales tax act of Utah is not 
applicable to occasional sales of trailers or semi-trailers by 
persons not regularly engaged in the retail business. 
3. Amendment of the definition and collection sections of 
the Sales Tax Act does not alter the scope of the tax. 
It is elementary that there is no imposition of a tax unless 
the rate is fixed and the subject matter definitely established. 
51 Am. Jur. 621; 46 A.L.R. 609, 639; South Covington Street-
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car Company vs. Bellevue, 105 (Ky.) 283, 49 S.W. 23, 57 
L.R.A. 50; People Ex Rel Seeley vs. Hall, 8 (Colo.) 485, 9 
P. 34; Albion vs. Boone County, 94 (Neb.) 494, 143 N.W. 
749. A grant of authority to collect a tax, where the tax had 
never been imposed, would make collection of the tax unlaw-
ful. 84 C.J.S. 679; Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. vs. City of Bridge-
port, 130 Atlantic 164, 103 (Conn.) 249. 
In the Sales Tax Act the tax is levied or imposed by Sec-
tion 59-15-4. The collection section is 59-15-5, which provides 
as follows: 
"The tax shall be paid by the purchaser directly to 
the State Tax Commission upon every sale of a motor 
vehicle subject to registration and licensing under the 
laws of this state, and shall be collected by the State 
Tax Commission at the time of such registration and 
licensing.'' 
But it must be remembered that this section does not 
impose the tax. And the antecedent of "the tax" is the tax 
established by Section 4 of the Act. 
Section 59-15-4, which is the section imposing the tax, 
was not amended when the language pertaining to motor 
vehicles was included by the legislature. This section still reads 
in part: "From and after the effective date of this Act, there 
is levied and there shall be collected and paid: (a) a tax upon 
every retail sale of tangible, personal property made within 
the State of Utah ... " That is the tax which the Act imposes; 
and when Section 5 refers to: "The tax under the provisions 
of this act," it is limited to imposition of tax on retail sales 
and it thus becomes plain that although Section 5 suggests 
that all sales of motor vehicles are subject to the tax, this 
17 
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careful analysis indicates that this section simply provides that 
the Tax Commission and the purchaser are responsible for 
collection and payment of "the tax" and no motor vehicle 
subject to "the tax" is to have registration changed until that 
tax has been paid. 
4. An interpretation singling out motor vehicles for tax-
ation, when sold in isolated or occasional transactions would 
be unconstitutional. 
It is axiomatic that a state has the power to make reason-
able and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. 
Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. 
Ed. 748. However, this power of a state to make classifications 
with respect to taxation is not unlimited. An early United States 
Supreme Court decision pointed out that a state legislature 
has no power to select particular persons or companies to bear 
the exclusive burdens of taxation. Provident lost. v. Massa-
chusetts, 6 Wall. 611, 18 L. Ed 907. 
Taxes should be levied with equality and uniformity and 
in accordance with some reasonable system of apportionment, 
calculated to distribute the public burden. Section 3 of Article 
XIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah requires a "Uni-
form and equal" taxation on all tangible property in the State. 
While this section refers to property, and not sales taxes, it 
exemplifies the requirement for equality and uniformity in 
taxation. The policy of equally distributing the public burden 
applies to a sales tax as well as a property tax. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Alabama has stated: 
"Whilst there is no provision of the Constitution 
commanding in terms and uniformity, the principle 
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should underlie and regulate the provisions of every 
law imposing public burdens and charges." Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. State Board of Assessment, 80 (Ala.) 
273, 60 Am. Rep. 99. (Reversed on other grounds in 
132 U. S. 472). 
Numerous cases can be cited for the general principle that 
classifications in tax statutes must be reasonable, natural, and 
founded upon some just and rational basis or distinction. 
Classifications may not be arbitrary, oppressive, hostile, capri-
cious, illusory or fanciful. No definite rules have been laid 
down in this area. Whether a classification for tax purposes 
is reasonable or arbitrary must be decided upon the facts and 
circumstances appearing in each particular case. 
In Winter v. Barrett, 352 (Ill.) 441, 186 N.E. 113, 89 
A.L.R. 1398, the Illinois Supreme Court had before it a statute 
imposing a tax upon persons engaged in the business of selling 
intangible personal property at retail, which exempted from 
the tax farmers selling their own produce and sellers of motor 
fuel. It was argued that the seller of motor fuel could be 
txcepted from the tax because an exicse tax was presently be-
ing collected for each gallon of gasoline sold. The Illinois 
could held that this tax on gasoline was on the consumer as 
a toll for use of the state highways, and was no basis for 
excepting the seller from the questioned tax. Because there 
was no valid basis for a discrimination in favor of farmers and 
sellers of gasoline, the court held that the statute violated the 
section of the State Constitution requiring that a tax shall be 
uniform as to the class upon which it operates, and offended 
against the equal protection clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions (89 A.L.R. at 1412-1416). The court held that 
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the tax on persons engaged in the business of selling tangible 
personal property at retail was an occupation tax, as distin-
guished from a tax on property, or on purchasers of property. 
Rather than having sales or the receipts therefrom as the 
subject of the tax, the subject matter taxed was the privilege 
of performing some busip.ess, while the amount of the tax 
was measured in sales. This is one type of sales tax. 47 Am. 
Jur. 195. 
Four years later this same court had before it a statute 
which imposed a tax measured by the gross receipts upon water, 
gas, or electricity supplied to persons for domestic or com-
mercial consumption ,but did not impose the tax when the 
same was supplied for industrial use. Chicago v. Ames, 365 
(Ill.) 529, 7 N.E. (2d) 294, 109 A.L.R. 1509 (1937). The 
discrimination was held to be unreasonable, and the statute 
was contrary to the uniformity clause of the State Constitution. 
The discrimination involved in the administrative inter-
pretation of the Utah sales ta~ is more readily apparent than 
in either of the Illinois cases. Their reading of the Utah tax 
does not merely except one or two groups from the class upon 
which it operates. Their interpretation singles out one par-
ticular event, the sale of a motor vehicle, and subjects it to 
a sales tax. Excepted from the tax are sales of semi-trailers, 
railroad cars, refrigerators, engines, farm tractors and many 
similar items which are within the same class of isolated or 
occasional sales. There is no reasonable basis for the taxing 
of isolated sales of motor vehicles and not occasional sales 
of other similar property. A state does not have this power to 
select particular persons or companies to bear the exclusive 
burdens of taxation. Provident Inst. v. Massacl1usetts, supra. 
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The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is applicable to state tax legislation. Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 75 L. ed 775, 50 S. Ct. 310; Louisville 
Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 72 L. ed 770, 48 S. 
Ct. 423. In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. 
S. 89, 21 S. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102, the Supreme Court of the 
United States had under consideration a statute of the State 
of Louisiana imposing a tax on the business of refining sugar 
<..nd molasses. The amount of the tax was based on gross annual 
receipts. The statute provided it should not apply to planters 
and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and mo-
lasses. This exemption was held valid, in that it did not deny 
equal protection of the laws to persons and corporations 
engaged in a general refining business. The Supreme Court 
stated: 
"The act in question does undoubtedly discriminate 
in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimi-
nation, if founded upon a reasonable distinction in 
principle, is valid. Of course, if such discriminaton were 
purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made 
to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, re-
ligious opinions, political affiliations, or other con-
siderations having no possible connection with the 
duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would 
be pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection 
of the laws to the less favored classes." 
The court found there was a reasonable distinction between 
the refiners who were taxed and the producers who were not 
taxed. 
In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 77 L. ed. 
929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699 (1933), the court held a 
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tax statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment where the classification was found to be without 
reasonable basis. The statute required a license to be obtained 
for the operation of a store, and imposed a greater tax per 
store where stores are located in more than one county than 
where they are all in the same county. The court was unable 
to discover any reasonable basis for this classification, in that 
an increase in the tax not only on a new store but on all the 
old stores, consequent upon the mere physical fact that the 
new one lies a few feet over a county line, finds no foundation 
in reason or in any fact of business experience. 
Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, 53 N.E. 2d 966, says in headnote 
14, "The designation of persons composing a class subject to 
tax may not be arbitrary or capricious and uniformity may be 
violated by including those in fact not within the class, as well 
as by excluding those properly within it." This statement seems 
to apply to the case here, and excluding from the tax all sales 
of an isolated or occasional nature by persons not regularly 
engaged in retail selling, and then making a general exception 
for motor vehicles only seems arbitrary and capricious. 
In Transport Manufacturing Equipment Co. v. Bates, 224 
S.W. 2d, 996, it is held that a statute imposing a use tax on 
motor vehicles, but exempting motor vehicles having a seating 
capacity of ten passengers or more, is void as violating con-
stituional provision that a tax shall be uniform on the same 
class of subjects. 
Likewise, an increased rate of tax on department stores, 
which would not be applicable to stores carrying the same 
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invalid for lack of a reasonable basis for distinction. Barker 
Bros. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 P. 2d 97. 
A statute requiring sanitation of buildings occupied by 
bread, biscuit and cake bakeries, but exempting from its opera-
tion buildings of pie, pastry and cracker bakeries is uncon-
stitutional as being discriminatory between members of vu-
tually the same class. State v. Miksicels, 125 S.W. 507. 
It is important that the State raise revenues; but it must 
be done with equality and non-discrimination as the standard. 
For the legislature to have singled out occasional sales of motor 
vehicles as subject to the tax, and have it apply otherwise only 
to sales made by persons regularly engaged in an organized 
retail selling business is discriminatory and therefore invalid. 
The imposition of the tax must be limited to persons engaged 
in such regular retail business. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The amendment of the Sales Tax Act by the 1949 legis-
lature was awkward and ambiguous and involved poor drafts-
manship. It shifted the collection burden from retailers (except 
registered automobile dealers) to the State Tax Commission 
and used the need for registration as the means of collecting 
the tax. This tended to expand the incidence of the tax since 
it placed upon the purchaser the burden of convincing the State 
Tax Commission that the vehicle involved had not been pur-
chased through a retailer or a regularly licensed automobile 
dealer. The practical effect of this has apparently become 
insistence on payment of the tax by all purchasers whether 
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arising from an isolated or occasional sale or not. But since the 
legislature did not expand the definition of retailer or change 
the incidence of the tax from one upon retail sale or sale by a 
retailer, it is plain under the statute that the only isolated 
or occasional sales of motor vehicles subject to the sales tax 
are those sold by regular retailers. 
The reference in the amendment to the motor vehicle reg-
istration laws compel this court, in the construction of the 
statute, to go to the motor vehicle laws for a definition of 
motor vehicle. These definitions plainly exclude trailers and 
5emi-trailers from the Sales Tax Act. 
The appellant is entitled to the benefit of strict construction 
in the application of this revenue measure which includes the 
construction that since the section levying the tax was not 
amended the legislature must be held not to have intended to 
change the tax levy or the imposition of the tax and simply 
to clarify the handling of motor vehicle sales when made by 
retailers. 
The foregoing constructions are all confirmed by the 
doubtful constitutionality of a tax law which would single out 
of many similar transactions and sales of many comparable 
commodities the sales only of motor vehicles. The singling 
out of sales of one commodity for taxation is a clear denial 
of the equal protection of the laws. 
This court should hold that the Sales Tax Act applies 
to sales of motor vehicles when made by persons regularly 
engaged in the selling of motor vehicles or other commodities 
but has no application to those isolated and occasional trans-
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actions which occur when a person not engaged in business 
or one engaged in a business other than regular selling of 
commodities chooses to transfer title to a motor vehicle. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. S. GLIKBARG 
15 5 Sansome Street 
San Francisco, California 
RICHARDS and BIRD 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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